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UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE NOW COVERS
PUNITIVE AWARD - HUTCHINSON v. J.C. PENNEY
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMPANY
INTRODUCTION
Assuming an injured party is entitled to recover punitive damages from
an uninsured negligent motorist, can the injured party recover those damages
from his insurance company under an uninsured motorist policy?
A split of authority exists among the few states which have decided the
issue.' In jurisdictions permitting recovery of punitive damages, uninsured
motorist coverage is intended to place the insurer in the shoes of the uninsured
tortfeasor.2 Since the insurer stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor, and since
punitive damages could be covered if the tortfeasor had his own insurance, it is
illogical to deny the victim punitive damages simply because the tortfeasor is
uninsured.' Other jurisdictions believe that punitive damages should not be
awarded since that award would not operate to punish the tortfeasor and
would therefore violate public policy.' In Hutchinson v. J.C Penney Casualty
Insurance Company5 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that such recovery is per-
missible and does not violate public policy.
FACTS OF HUTCHINSON
Plaintiff, Natalie S. Hutchinson, was legally crossing a street6 when she
was struck by Raymond Garrett, an uninsured motorist. Garrett had collided
with a motorist shortly before and was attempting to elude the police when he
struck plaintiff. The police apprehended Garrett who subsequently pleaded
guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,7 reckless operation, and
failure to obey traffic control devices
'Several states have permitted recovery: Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 3d 195,
478 N.E.2d 1000 (1985); Cuppett v. Grange Mut. Companies, 12 Ohio App. 3d 82, 466 N.E.2d 180 (Erie
County Ct. App. 1983); Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1984); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522
S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
Several states have denied recovery: Hanna v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C.
1964); California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 164 Cal. App. 3d 257, 210 Cal. Rptr. 140
(1985); Suarez v. Aguiar, 351 So. 2d. 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440
A.2d 359 (Me. 1982); Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964): Burns v.
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 574, 360 N.W.2d 61 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
'See, e.g., Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 670.
31d.
'See e.g.. Burns. 121 Wis. 2d at 580, 360 N.W.2d at 64-65.
117 Ohio St. 3d 195, 478 N.E.2d 1000 (1985).
blssues of contributory or comparative negligence were not considered since it was presumed by both sides
that plaintiff did not negligently cross the street. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney
Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 3d 195, 478 N.E. 2d 1000 (1985).
'An alcohol-urine test administered to Garrett after the accident revealed .17 alcohol content. Id. at 2.
'Evidence shows that Garrett failed to yield to a "35 mph" speed limit sign, a yellow school zone sign, a "20
mph" speed limit sign. and a stop light. Id. at 1-2.
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As a result of the accident, plaintiff was dragged 70 feet, suffered a frac-
tured pelvis and sustained multiple abrasions. Plaintiff was hospitalized where
doctors discovered a lump in her right groin. The lump was a secondary injury
to the fractured pelvis and required surgical removal. Plaintiff was left with a
permanent deformity of her right thigh.'
Plaintiff was a "covered person" within the coverage of defendant J.C.
Penney Casualty Insurance Company's four insurance policies. Each policy
provided bodily injury coverage of $50,000 for each person and $100,000 for
each accident. It was agreed that the policies could be "stacked" to provide
plaintiff with coverage up to $200,000.0
After being unable to reach a settlement with defendant, plaintiff submit-
ted the issue of damages to binding arbitration. The arbitration panel awarded
plaintiff $17,500 compensatory damages, $35,000 punitive damages, and
$17,500 in attorney fees. Plaintiff then applied to the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas to reduce her award to judgment according to Ohio Revised
Code § 2711.09.
The common pleas court held that the arbitration panel exceeded its au-
thority and vacated the award of punitive damages and attorney fees." Plain-
tiff then appealed. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court and
held that the award for punitive damages and attorney fees was not against
public policy and was within the uninsured motorist coverage of the policies.'2
However, instead of reinstating the amounts awarded, the court of appeals
remanded the case with instructions to redetermine the amounts awarded by
the arbitration panel.'3 Plaintiff then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court to
reinstate the arbitration panel award. Defendant cross-appealed claiming that
punitive damages and attorney fees should not be awarded."
OHIO'S PUNITIVE PHILOSOPHY
Punitive damages are imposed for one of two reasons: either to punish the
tortfeasor in order to discourage the reoccurrence of similar behavior, or to
permit the victim to recover for the supposed aggravation of the injury.'5 The
clear majority of states adopt the punishment view of punitive damages.' In
91d. at 3.
'lid. at 2.
"Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., No. 82CV-08-4883, (C.P., Franklin County, Ohio 1982).
"Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., No. 83AP-136, slip op. at 176 (10th Cir. Ct. App. Feb. 7,
1984).
"Id. at 188.
"Issues concerning the authority of binding arbitration were resolved in favor of plaintiff and will not be fur-
ther discussed. The balance of this paper focuses on the punitive damage aspect of the cross appeal. Hutchin-
son, 17 Ohio St. 3d 195, 478 N.E. 2d 1000 (1985).
"Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
6Excepting Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington, all states permit punitive damages in ap-
[Vol. 19:2
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Detling v. Chockley", the Ohio Supreme Court held in a per curiam decision
that "the rationale for allowing punitive damages has been recognized in Ohio
as that of punishing the offending party and setting him up as an example to
others that they might be deterred from similar conduct . *... , While the
Hutchinson court purported to maintain the punishment philosophy of Det-
ling, its decision operates to ignore the punitive effect and award damages sim-
ply to provide additional compensation to the victim.
One issue in Hutchinson is whether the punitive effect of punitive
damages can be realized if those damages are paid by the victim's insurance
company under an uninsured motorist policy. The court answered in the affir-
mative for two reasons. First, the court determined that in the majority of
states it is not against public policy to allow liability insurance to include
coverage for punitive damages. 9 The court then held that uninsured motorist
coverage of punitive damages would not violate public policy since uninsured
motorist coverage should be construed to operate as liability insurance. 0 Sec-
ond, the court reasoned the tortfeasor remains ultimately liable to the in-
surance company for indemnification and is, therefore, indirectly punished for
his wrongdoings." Both of these rationales are disputed by the dissent22 and
other jurisdictions.23
A significant difference exists between liability insurance and uninsured
motorist coverage. Many states permit apparent frustration of the punitive ef-
fect of punitive damages by permitting the potential tortfeasor to insure
against them with liability insurance.2 ' In actuality, that apparent frustration
propriate situations. Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History. Their Use And Their Worth In Present-Day
Society. 49 U. Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 1,4 (1980).
Only Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, and New Hampshire view punitive damages as compensatory.
All other states view punitive damages as a form of punishment. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled
Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 875 1976).
1770 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208 (1982).
"Detling, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208.
1d. It is curious to note that the Ohio Supreme Court has never decided this issue, and that lower Ohio
courts have determined that public policy is violated when liability insurance offers protection against
punitive damages. Willowick Towers Inv. Co. v. General Ins. Co., Lake App. No. 7-239 (Sept. 22, 1980);
Troyer v. Horvath, Cuyahoga App. No. 46530 (Nov. 3, 1983).
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d at 1002.
"Id. at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wright viewed the award solely as additional compensation and believed
that the punishment function of punitive damages had been defeated. Id. at 201, 478 N.E.2d at 1005
(Wright, J., dissenting). Wright also believed that this decision would violate public policy by increasing the
rates for uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 202-3, 478 N.E.2d at 1007.
"See supra note 1.
2'These courts permit insurability of punitive damages: Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Casualty Co. of America v. Woodby, 238
F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978); Norfolk & Western Ry. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills,
345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522
(1972); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Green-
wood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Olds-
RECENT CASESFall, 19851
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does not exist. The potential tortfeasor specifically contracted for that protec-
tion and realizes the punitive effect of increased premiums or loss of insurabili-
ty." In the case of uninsured motorist coverage, the tortfeasor has not con-
tracted for the protection nor is he influenced by the non-existent threat of in-
creased premiums. Since the tortfeasor and insured are different persons, the
punitive effect of increased rates cannot be realized in uninsured motorist
coverage.
The Hutchinson court further noted that the effect of punitive damages is
not defeated since the defendant insurance company may bring an action
against the uninsured motorist for indemnification, including indemnification
for punitive damages." This rationale purports to find a punitive effect in
holding the tortfeasor ultimately liable. In practice, however, an uninsured
motorist tortfeasor is a poor candidate from which to seek indemnification."
First, it is unlikely that the uninsured motorist will be able to reimburse the in-
surer because his lack of insurance implies that he is probably judgment
proof." Second, punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of the unin-
sured motorist as in the case of the hit-and-run accident. In these cases, the
tortfeasor is not available as a source of indemnification.2 9
The Hutchinson decision creates another problem with respect to the sup-
posed punitive effect of punitive damages. The amount of damages should
operate as a proper punishment relative to the tortfeasor's pecuniary condi-
tion. 0 If punitive damages are awarded in the absence of the tortfeasor, as in
the case of a hit-and-run accident, then evidence of the tortfeasor's pecuniary
condition is not available, thereby making the punitive award arbitrary."
mobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,511 P.2d 783 (1983); City of Cedar Rapids v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 1981); Continental Ins. Companies v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1973); First National Bank and Deposit Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389
A.2d 359 (1978); Anthony v. Firth, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 198 1); Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Carroway v.
Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639,
383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
State v. Glenn Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313,404 A.2d 101 (1979); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W.
Va. 1981). See also Morrissy, Punitive Damages - Insurability. 25 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 257 (1981).
25Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1984) (Drowata, J., dissenting).
'6Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
2 Telephone interview with Jerome B. Haddox, Secretary, Vice President, and General Counsel for J.C. Pen-
ney Casualty Insurance Company (Aug. 20, 1985). J.C. Penney actively seeks indemnification from tort-
feasors. Id. In 1984, J.C. Penney recovered 1.5% of their subrogation payouts for uninsured motorist
coverage. Id. Litigation expenses and improbability of collection make the punitive effect of punitive
damages theoretically possible, but practically improbable. Id.
2 Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 360 N.W.2d 61, 64-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
9Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 673 (Drowota, J., dissenting). In Mullins, a default judgment was entered against a
hit-and-run defendant and plaintiff was awarded punitive damages without proof of defendant's pecuniary
condition.
3Id.
31 ld.
[Vol. 19:2
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The difficulty of realizing the punitive effect of punitive damages in unin-
sured motorist coverage is ignored by a small minority of courts who treat the
insurance contract as controlling." In order to justify an award of punitive
damages, those jurisdictions only require that the insurance contract provide
for such coverage.3 The majority in Hutchinson adopted this minority view
focusing on the contractual relationship between insured and insurer.
The court examined the provision of the policy35 and held that the extent
of coverage is ambiguous when an insurer promises to pay for all "bodily in-
jury" caused by an uninsured motorist. The court believed that the provision
could be read to either include or exclude punitive damages. 6 The court fur-
ther held that in cases where policy language is ambiguous, the language "will
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.""
Accordingly, the court interpreted this policy to include coverage for punitive
damages. 8
This finding raises two additional issues. First, was the contract language
really ambiguous enough to warrant an interpretation against the insurer? Sec-
ond, assuming that a contract could be found, is that contract void as against
public policy?
"See supra note I.
"See, e.g., Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 671.
-Hutchinson is a 4-3 decision which represents a departure from the philosophy espoused in Detling. In
Detling, a unanimous court held that punitive damages are proper only if punishment will result. Detling, 70
Ohio St. 2d at 136,436 N.E.2d at 209. The Hutchinson decision permits punitive damages where a provision
for such damages has been included in the insurance contract. A change in personnel may explain this
change in philosophy. Detling was decided by Milligan, C.J., Brown, Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, Brown, and
Krupansky, JJ. In Hutchinson, Locher and Holmes, J.J., maintained their opinion in Detling and were joined
in dissent by Wright, J., Brown, Douglas and Sweeney, J.J., apparently changed their position from Detling
and were joined by Celebrezze, C.J., who did not participate in the Detling decision.
"The pertinent provision of the policy reads as follows: "We will pay damages which a covered person is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident..." Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d
at 1002.
-Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"This canon of insurance language construction was previously defined by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Price, 39 Ohio St. 2d 95, 313 N.E.2d 844 (1974). The canon is broadly accepted
on two theories. First, in cases where the insurer promises a broad plan of coverage, he assumes a duty to
define any limitations he wishes to place on that coverage. An absence of expressed limitations presumes
that the insurer did not intend to limit the coverage at the time the policy was sold. Second, insurance
policies are viewed as contracts of adhesion since they are offered to the insured on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
As such, the policies will be interpreted to mean what a reasonably prudent person would understand them
to mean. Note, Punitive Damages - Public Policy Does Not Preclude Payment Of Punitive Damages
Under An Insurance Policy, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 178 (1983-84).
-'Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003. In applying the aforementioned principles of
liberal construction to the uninsured motorist provision, the court found the plaintiff's arguments well taken
in that "punitive damages are the type of damages which a party would be legally entitled to recover ...
where the facts and circumstances of a particular case warrant such an award." Id. By structuring the
language as it did, the defendant insurance company has agreed to subrogate itself into the position of the
uninsured motorist tortfeasor. The court then reasoned that since the provision did not clearly prohibit such
an award of punitive damages, it is reasonable to assume that such an award should be awarded in a proper
case as a consequence of bodily injury. Id.
Fall, 19851 RECENT CASES
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As to the first issue, whether a promise to pay for all "bodily injury" can
be construed to include coverage for punitive damages, the court looked to
Ohio's statutorily-mandated minimum of uninsured motorist coverage.3 9 The
maximum extent of coverage is limited by the type of insurance purchased. No
state has permitted punitive damages where the statute and insurance policy
have limited coverage to "bodily injury.""" The only states to permit recovery
for punitive damages have found that either the statute or the policy extends
coverage beyond mere "bodily injury.""
In Hutchinson, Ohio has gone one step further. J.C. Penney's policy pro-
vided for statutorily mandated coverage. 2 Ohio law requires coverage for
"bodily injury.""3 The scope of the coverage cannot be extended beyond "bodi-
ly injury" either by statute or by contract." The court must have adopted the
belief that "bodily injury" coverage, alone, includes punitive damages. Since no
other state, even those permitting recovery for punitive damages, has reached
"See supra note 43.
'The following cases represent a list of states that have considered the issue of whether an uninsured
motorist provision includes a punitive damage award. However, these states have refused to authorize such
coverage: California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 164 Cal. App. 3d 257, -, 210 Cal. Rptr.
140, 142-43 (1985); Suarez v. Aguiar, 351 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Braley v. Berkshire
Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A. 2d 359, 360 (Me. 1982); Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, -, 134 S.E. 2d
206, 210 (1964); Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 574, 579-80, 360 N.W. 2d 61, 63 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1984). In each case the policy provided coverage equal to the statutory requirement of "bodily injury,"
and in each case recovery for "bodily injury" did not include punitive damages.
See also Kahn, Looking For "Bodily Injury".- What Triggers Coverage Under A Standard Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Policy?, 19 FORUM 532 (1984). The article points out that "bodily injury" has
been construed to include "any localized abnormal condition of the body." Id. at 537. The term is limited to
internal injuries, damaged tissue, some forms of disease, sickness, emotional stress, mental distress, rape, and
birth of a deformed child. Id. at 537-38. "The concept of bodily injury must be distinguished from 'personal
injury,' which results from false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, and similar
acts." Id. at 538.
'Only the following states have permitted recovery for punitive damages. In each, recovery was predicated
on the theory that either the statute or the policy provided for more than mere "bodily injury." Mullins. 683
S.W.2d at 670 (legislative history indicates a desire to equate uninsured motorist coverage with liability in-
surance in all respects, including punitive damage coverage); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594,
597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (policy extended coverage beyond "bodily injury" by promising to cover "all sums
which . . . the insured shall be legally entitled to recover"); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 85,
189 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1972) (statute requires that each policy contains "provisions undertaking to pay the in-
sured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle").
1
2See supra note 35.
*
3OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(1) (Page 1984). The statute reads in pertinent part:
Uninsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the automobile
liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection for bodily injury or death un-
der provisions approved by the superintendent of insurance, for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death resulting therefrom. (Emphasis
added.)
"The Hutchinson court, in its decision, did not examine the statute, its intent, or its legislative history. The
court based its judgment solely on an understanding of "bodily injury" coverage as it appeared in the policy
provision. Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197-98, 478 N.E.2d at 1003. See also, Brief of Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant at 16, Hutchinson v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 3d 195, 478 N.E. 2d
1000 (1985).
[Vol. 19:2
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RECENT CASES
this conclusion, 5 this may be a strained interpretation.
The court rationalized its finding of a punitive damage contract by
reasoning that uninsured motorist coverage should provide a broad-based
source of coverage, including coverage for punitive damages. ' The Hutchin-
son court cites Kish v. Central National Insurance Group,47 in support of that
proposition. ' However, this support is untenable. 9
The Kish court held that intentional injuries could be covered within the
meaning of uninsured motorist coverage, even though such an award would be
excluded from liability insurance coverage. 0 Accordingly, the Hutchinson
court reasoned that uninsured motorist coverage must be a broader form of
coverage than ordinary liability insurance.5
While the Kish decision mandates coverage for intentionally caused in-
juries, it does not stand for the proposition that uninsured motorist coverage
should be liberally construed in order to provide a broad based form of
coverage. The Kish court expressly rejected a liberal interpretation of the
policy language which defined the extent of coverage. 2 Kish directly opposes
the proposition that uninsured motorist policies should be read more liberally
than other types of policies. 3
In Hutchinson, the court has given a highly liberal construction to "bodily
injury" coverage. Until Hutchinson, Ohio courts have refused to give in-
"See supra note 40.
*Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
1167 Ohio St. 2d 41, 424 N.E.2d 288 (1981).
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
41n dissent, Justice Wright rejected the majority's position that Kish lends support to its position because
"Kish involved essentially the availability of compensatory, and not punitive damages." 17 Ohio St. 3d at
202, 478 N.E. 2d at 1006 (Wright, J., dissenting). (Emphasis original).
-"Kish. 67 Ohio St. 2d 41,424 N.E.2d 288. In Kish. an uninsured motorist intentionally shot and killed the in-
sured after the two had accidentally collided. Id. at 42, 424 N.E.2d at 289. The insured's estate sought to
recover under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage. The insurer argued that since the killing was inten-
tional, the claim would be excluded from coverage. The estate argued that the killing was accidental since it
was the result of an accidental car accident. Id. at 43, 46, 424 N.E.2d at 290, 292.
The Kish court adopted the estate's view and held that the mind of the insured should determine if the act
was accidental or intentional. Id. at 48, 424 N.E.2d at 293, Accordingly, the killing was viewed as accidental
and payment of the claim was possible. Id. at 49, 424 N.E.2d at 293. The Hutchinson court rationalized that
since liability insurance would have excluded coverage for such an intentional tort, that uninsured motorist
coverage must be a broader form of coverage.
The Kish court, however, refused to find for the estate. The language of the policy covered injuries sus-
tained as the result of an accident with an uninsured motor vehicle. The court held that reasonable minds
could not interpret this language to include coverage for a shotgun death, even though the death was ac-
cidental relative to the insured, and was the result of a traffic accident. Id. at 52, 424 N.E.2d at 295.
The Kish decision actually runs counter to Hutchinson. The Hutchinson court used Kish to support a
liberal reading of coverage defined as "bodily injury." In Kish, the court refused to apply a liberal construc-
tion to the provision of coverage.
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"Kish. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 52, 424 N.E.2d at 295.
31d.
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surance policy provisions a highly liberal construction, especially in cases
where the intent of the parties, at the time of contracting, would be defeated by
such construction.
The second issue concerns the contract's application in light of public
policy. Even if a contract for coverage is found, it will be struck down as void if
it operates to contravene public policy.55 Likewise, an insurance contract will
be struck down if the beneficiary does not have an insurable interest.56 Assum-
ing that the insurer had contracted to include punitive damages within the
uninsured motorist policy, and that punitive damages will be awarded without
punishing the tortfeasor, is the contract void as against public policy?
Most courts have answered no." The troublesome area is determining
whether or not a contract exists. If it can be shown that the insurer had con-
tracted to provide for such coverage, most courts will not consider enforce-
ment of that contract to be violative of public policy."
Public policy may be compromised, however, when an insurer is forced to
pay the punitive award. In Hutchinson, the court interpreted "bodily injury"
coverage to provide punitive damages.59 Had the insurer assumed that the poli-
cy was clear in excluding punitive awards, then public policy would be violat-
ed. The insurer did not exact payment for that coverage and, as such, must in-
crease premiums among all other policy holders or compromise the viability of
his company.' An understanding of the intended punitive effect of punitive
damages would prevent an insurer from presuming that public policy demands
payment for punitive damages when the insurer offers "bodily injury"
coverage.6
"See, e.g., Orris v. Claudio, 63 Ohio St. 2d 140, 143, 406 N.E.2d 1381, 1383 (1980). In Orris, the court
reasoned that "... . there is a preponderance of merit in the insurance company's argument that the terms of
the contract of insurance must be given due consideration, and that weight must be given to what was con-
templated by the parties." Id. In Randolph v. Grange Mut. Casualty Co., 57 Ohio St. 2d 25, 385 N.E.2d
1305 (1979), the court held that "the rule of liberal construction of ambiguities in favor of the insured is inap-
plicable where the result obtained would not conceivably have been intended by the parties." Id. at 28, 385
N.E.2d at 1307.
"RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 598 comment a (1932). "If... it appears that the bargain forming the basis
of the action is opposed to public policy or transgresses statutory prohibitions, the courts ordinarily give him
no assistance."
"Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 396 (6 Gray 1856). Insurance coverage is valid only when
it is a contract to indemnify the beneficiary from loss. A life insurance policy on the life of another is not
valid unless the beneficiary has an interest in the life of the insured. Absence of such an interest operates as a
wager which may provoke criminal behavior. Id
"See supra note 24.
591d.
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197-98, 478 N.E.2d at 1002-3.
'Premium rates include "amountis which] will enable the company to (i) to pay losses to be incurred during
the life of such policies..., (2) to pay other proper operating expenses of the company, and (3) to retain a fair
and reasonable profit." Allen, Insurance Rate Regulation And The Courts: North Carolinas "Battleground"
Becomes A "Hornbook, " 61 N.C.L. REV. 97, 100-101 (1982-83).
"See supra note 16.
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However, the situation is different when the insurer volunteers to provide
punitive damage coverage by contract. Public policy is not violated since such
coverage does not punish the wrong party, or lessen the punitive effect of
punitive damages.62 The tortfeasor is still ultimately liable; he is subjected to
the same peril regardless of whether the victim is covered by uninsured
motorist coverage. The liability of the tortfeasor merely shifts to the insurer.
The only difference is that the victim is guaranteed to receive the punitive
award while the insurer must cover any loss. The insurer is not punished by
the loss. He has contracted to receive increased premiums as compensation for
that risk, and he is not faced with an unexpected claim.
Finally, public policy is violated if insurance coverage is provided to an in-
sured who does not have an insurable interest.63 In Hutchinson, the insured
does have an insurable interest, an interest he could otherwise recover from
the tortfeasor had the tortfeasor been available for payment." The insured
simply receives an amount to which he is entitled. The insurance coverage
merely operates as a conduit from which the insured is guaranteed payment
and does not operate as a wager.
IMPACT PUNISHES POLICYHOLDERS
The Hutchinson court has reached a bizarre decision.65 The decision
represents a strained interpretation of policy language and operates to punish
an innocent party. While the Hutchinson decision seems to violate the intend-
ed purpose of punitive damages, it will have a minimal direct impact on the in-
surance industry since most insurers are now incorporating language
specifically excluding punitive damage coverage." The real importance of the
decision lies in the inferences that can be drawn from the opinion.
For example, the Hutchinson decision may indicate a softening of the
view that punitive damages are intended solely for the purpose of punishment.
The court permitted punitive damages without any showing of punitive effect
simply because the contract provided for such coverage.67 The court may now
"Home indem. Co., 522 S.W.2d at 597.
6See supra note 56.
"BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 720 (5th ed. 1979). An insurable interest is "[sluch a real and substantial interest
in specific property as will prevent a contract to indemnify the person interested against its loss from being a
mere wager policy."
6Provoked by the Hutchinson decision, Charles Horn introduced a bill proposing legislation that would pro-
hibit punitive damage awards under an uninsured motorist policy. S. 249, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
Charles Horn is a Republican state senator from Dayton, Ohio.
"Telephone interview with Jerome B. Haddox, Secretary, Vice President, and General Counsel for J.C. Pen-
ney Casualty Insurance Company (Aug. 20, 1985). The Insurance Service Office drafts insurance policies on
behalf of its member companies that currently insure 50% of the private passenger automobiles in Ohio. Id.
It is presumed that they will consider amending their policy language to expressly exclude punitive damage
coverage. Id.
61Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
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be adopting the philosophy that punitive damages are intended, at least in part,
to compensate the victim for the aggravation of the tort. Prior to this decision,
the Ohio Supreme Court has strictly required that punitive damages punish the
tortfeasor.8
Furthermore, while the Ohio Supreme Court has never decided the issue,
Hutchinson stands in dicta for the proposition that punitive damages are also
insurable under liability insurance. The court was likely influenced by ap-
pellant's argument that the majority of other jurisdictions permitted liability
insurance to cover punitive damages.69
This philosophy runs counter to previous case law in Ohio. Prior to this
decision, lower Ohio courts had decided that punitive damages were not in-
surable under a liability insurance policy.70 These courts reasoned that it was
against public policy to award punitive damages if that award did not operate
to punish the tortfeasor."
Additionally, the court exhibits the liberal construction it will give to in-
surance contracts in order to benefit the insured.72 The court held that "bodily
injury" coverage was to include coverage for punitive damages.73 No other
jurisdiction has been willing to extend "bodily injury" coverage to this degree.7"
The Ohio legislature has been on a campaign since 1980 to simplify in-
surance policy language.75 Ohio believes that simplified language is necessary
to provide policy holders with a meaningful understanding of their coverage.76
The Hutchinson decision may hinder that goal by preventing insurers from us-
ing simplified "plain English" language. Insurers will refuse to compromise
contract precision in order to obtain "plain English" policies.77
'"Detling, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 136, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1982).
'
9Hutchinson. 17 Ohio St. 3d at 197, 478 N.E.2d at 1002.
'See supra note 20.
71Id.
"in dissent, Justice Wright said that "[ujnfortunately, the majority has ignored the well-founded rationale
underlying punitive damages and instead has provided an enhanced reward to an adequately compensated
party solely for reward's sake." Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 201, 478 N.E. 2d at 1005 (Wright, J., dissent-
ing).
"Hutchinson. 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"See supra note 40.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.01-08 (Page 1984).
"7Id.
"in Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983), a similar issue
arose. Several homeowners were protected by a "plain English" homeowner's policy issued by defendant. Id.
at 534, 656 P.2d at 1079. The homeowners suffered a loss as a result of mud slides caused by the eruption of
Mount St. Helens. Id. Defendant's "plain English" policy excluded coverage for "earth movement" in sim-
plified language. A prior unsimplified policy, offering the same coverage, contained language which express-
ly excluded coverage for damage caused by volcanic eruption. The enumerated exceptions to coverage were
removed in order to simplify the readability of the policy. Id. at 535, 656 P.2d at 1079.
The Washington Supreme Court held for plaintiffs. Id. at 539, 656 P.2d at 1081. The court reasoned that
mud slides and volcanic eruptions were not forms of "earth movement" as excluded by the new "plain
English" policy. Id.
[Vol. 19:2
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Finally, the costs of uninsured motorist coverage must necessarily rise as
a result of Hutchinson."8 Insurers are faced with one of two choices. They must
either provide coverage under the Hutchinson decision or rewrite the language
of the policy to specifically exclude that coverage. In either case, the increase
in expense is a result of Hutchinson. Since insurance rates are calculated based
on the amount of claim dollars paid, those additional expenses will be passed
on to the policyholders.79
CONCLUSION
In Hutchinson, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the philosophy that it is
not against public policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage that covers
punitive damages.A0 By doing so, Ohio places itself in the minority."
The court justifies its decision by holding that an insurer can provide such
coverage under contract law. 2 By giving liberal construction to the provisions
of the policy, the court held that since the terms of the policy were ambiguous,
the policy would be construed in favor of the insured and accordingly provide
coverage. 3 The court strained the terms of the policy to effect this result.
When compared to other jurisdictions, the Hutchinson court interpreted
policy provisions most liberally.8
The court then sought further support for its decision by finding that the
uninsured motorist provision would indirectly impose a punishment on the
tortfeasor8 5 The court reasoned that the tortfeasor would be punished since
the insurer could bring an action for indemnification. 6
The final analysis of Graham is that "Jilf insurers must communicate the substance of their policy to their
insureds in order to rely on its terms, they will have to produce policy forms that both their customers and
their agents can readily understand. The Graham decision discourages such simplification." Autopsy Of A
Plain English Insurance Contract: Can Plain English Survive Proximate Cause? 59 WASH. L. REV. 565, 581
(1984).
"Telephone interview with Jerome B. Haddox, Secretary, Vice President, and General Counsel for J.C. Pen-
ney Casualty Insurance Company (Aug. 20, 1985). In an effort to minimize the impact of Hutchinson. J.C.
Penney has redrafted their current policy to expressly exclude punitive damage coverage. Id. However, since
the decision in Hutchinson was unanticipated when the original policy was drafted, all uninsured motorist
policy holders in Ohio will be ultimately charged for all expenses resulting from that decision. Id. These ex-
penses include the Hutchinson award, possible awards under policies which have not yet expired, litigation
expenses, and costs of incorporating new policy language. id. It is anticipated that these rate increases will be
minimal. Id. If, however, J.C. Penney had decided to continue punitive damage coverage, as defined by
Hutchinson. premiums for uninsured motorist coverage would have significantly increased. Id.
"In simple terms, premium prices are set presuming that 70% will be paid out in claims, 25% will be used to
run the company, and 5% will be used as profit. Id. Accordingly, premiums will increase as either claims or
operating expenses increase. Id.
8 Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"See supra note I.
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
3Id.
uSee supra note 40.
"Hutchinson, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 198, 478 N.E.2d at 1003.
"ld.
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The practical aspects of such a finding are doubtful. 7 An uninsured
motorist is a poor candidate from which to seek indemnification.8 The prob-
ability of recovering is further lessened by the fact that the identity of the tort-
feasor may not be known, as in the case of the hit-and-run tortfeasor 9 Thus,
under the facts in Hutchinson, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court has
reached a bizarre result.
DALE KATZENMEYER
8
'See supra note 27.
UBurns, 121 Wis. 2d at 580, 360 N.W.2d at 64-65.
"Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 673 (Drowota, J., dissenting).
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